The strategic use of narratives to exert non-coercive influence is a topic of growing interest in International Relations (Miskimmon et al. 2013; Roselle et al. 2014; Price 2015; Freedman 2006) . Alistair Miskimmon, Ben O'Loughlin and Laura Roselle use the concept of strategic narrative to describe the assemblage of messages through which a state tries to construct 'a shared meaning of the past, present and future of international politics' that will guide other actors' behavior (Miskimmon et al. 2013, p 2) . A narrative can be understood as the accentuation and emplotment of particular problems or turning points in a way that indicates causation and points to a normatively desirable resolution. In Russia's strategic narrative, for example, 'American interference' is accentuated as a problem and emplotted as the cause of instability in various parts of the world. Steps that would counterbalance the USA's ability to intervene are logically promoted within the Russian narrative as a desirable goal (Szostek 2017a). The Ukrainian strategic narrative, in contrast, problematizes Russia's behaviour as a destabilising force in global politics. Ukrainian officials emplot illegitimate Russian intervention as the cause of their country's difficulties, suggesting international pressure on Russia as a desirable solution (Feklyunina and Romanova 2017) . Recent work on strategic narratives has evolved from a much broader body of research about 'soft power', This is the pre-publication version of an article to be published in The International Journal of Press/Politics (accepted 20 October 2017) . Please cite the published version. This version is for private research and study; it must not be distributed further.
public diplomacy and international broadcasting (for example, Entman 2008; Melissen 2005; Nye 2011; Seib 2012; Sheafer and Gabay 2009 ). This research is largely state-and mediacentric; it focuses on processes of projection more than processes of reception. Yet 'soft power' policies, public diplomacy and international broadcasting are implicitly or explicitly
aimed at influencing what audiences think. Therefore, a turn towards studying the audiences 'targeted' by states in their pursuit of influence is appropriate and necessary if the mechanisms via which influence occurs are to be understood.
Media repertoires and credibility
To influence a mass audience, a strategic narrative must reach individuals via the media they consume and it must be assessed as more credible than other competing narratives.
The processes of media repertoire formation (Hasebrink and Popp 2006; Hasebrink and Domeyer 2012) and credibility assessment therefore constitute the focus of attention in the present study.
The media repertoires of Ukrainian citizens have not previously been studied in any depth.
However, research from other geographic contexts suggests that media repertoires take shape through interaction between motivational factors and structural or situational constraints (Taneja et al. 2012; Wonneberger et al. 2011; Cooper and Tang 2009; Van den Bulck 2006) . The long tradition of research into the 'uses and gratifications' of media consumption (Blumler and Katz 1974; Papacharissi 2008; Althaus and Tewksbury 2000) is premised on the idea that rational individuals purposefully decide what to watch or read based on personal needs, interests or predispositions. Desire for opinion reinforcement ('cognitive consonance') is among the motives that can draw a person to particular news This is the pre-publication version of an article to be published in The International Journal of Press/Politics (accepted 20 October 2017) . Please cite the published version. This version is for private research and study; it must not be distributed further.
outlets. This is the basis of the 'selective exposure' hypothesis which has been variously challenged (Sears and Freedman 1967; Guess 2016; Zaller 1992) , endorsed (Best et al. 2005; Stroud 2008; Knobloch-Westerwick and Meng 2011; Johnson et al. 2011) and qualified (Frey 1986; Garrett 2009; Flaxman et al. 2016; Dvir-Gvirsman et al. 2014) An individual who encounters conflicting narratives in the media is likely to make judgements about those narratives' relative credibility. Research explaining credibility has a long history spanning several disciplines (for reviews, see Metzger et al. 2003; Self 2009; Rieh and Danielson 2007) . In everyday parlance, credibility is often treated as an innate attribute of information or information sources (e.g. 'a credible witness', 'credible evidence'). However, the concept is better understood as the subjective perception that certain information corresponds to reality and that a certain information source can reasonably be believed (Gunther 1992; Choi et al. 2006; Flanagin and Metzger 2007) .
Individuals are said to recognise underlying 'dimensions' of credibility (Hovland and Weiss This is the pre-publication version of an article to be published in The International Journal of Press/Politics (accepted 20 October 2017) . Please cite the published version. This version is for private research and study; it must not be distributed further.
1951; Gaziano and McGrath 1986; Meyer 1988; Thorson et al. 2010) . Credibility can be attached to persons, groups and organizations, to media sources, or to messages communicated by persons, groups and organizations via the media (Choi et al. 2006 ). These different 'levels' of credibility are closely interlinked (Kiousis 2001; Rieh and Danielson 2007) . Hilligoss and Rieh (2008) propose a framework for studying the assessment of credibility which distinguishes between (1) construct, or how individuals conceptualize credibility; (2) heuristics, which are rules of thumb people use to make credibility judgments across a variety of situations; and (3) interaction, or how credibility is assessed in response to specific source or content cues.
Heuristics used to judge credibility include the civility or tone of language used in a message Metzger et al. 2010; Hilligoss and Rieh 2008; Livio and Cohen 2016; Sundar 2008) ; and the visual design or appearance of a source or message (Fogg et al. 2003; Metzger et al. 2010) .
Source genre can be a cue for heuristic credibility judgements: in Western contexts, 'official' sources and news websites seem to be considered more credible than personal websites (Flanagin and Metzger 2007) , although a study in Russia found the opposite to be true among some news consumers (Szostek 2016). Observation of consistency across sources is another heuristic often used in credibility judgements (Metzger et al. 2010; Hilligoss and Rieh 2008) . This is the pre-publication version of an article to be published in The International Journal of Press/Politics (accepted 20 October 2017) . Please cite the published version. This version is for private research and study; it must not be distributed further.
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When it comes to interaction with specific sources or content, credibility judgements are strongly affected by issue involvement, or the extent to which the attitudinal issue under consideration is of personal importance (Petty and Cacioppo 1979, 1986 judged. This is because audiences, over time, can develop awareness of the state (or other collective entity) which stands behind a given strategic narrative and of the media sources most inclined to convey or endorse it. The assessment of a strategic narrative's credibility might therefore be considered an ongoing evaluation that encompasses communicator and medium, rather than a series of judgements on separate occasions about discrete pieces of information of unknown provenance. The present study of news consumption and reception in Ukraine explores these ideas and how credibility is best understood in the saturated, polarised media environment of a country engaged in 'information war'.
Research design
The 'diary-plus-interview' study was conducted between August and October 2016 in Odesa, Ukraine. It was the second stage of a larger project; the first stage was a survey (n = 1,000), the results of which are reported elsewhere (Szostek 2017b). The company TNS Ukraine was commissioned to help implement both stages.
An advantage of the diary-plus-interview method is that it does not restrict participant responses to categories imposed by the researcher. It offers a window on 'how particular audience groups engage in different ways with particular forms and genres of the mass media' rather than simply 'how audiences are affected by the mass media' (Livingstone 1993). As MacGinty and Firchow (2016) have argued, the 'everyday' narratives which people in conflict-affected areas use to describe their own reality can be quite different to narratives generated by elites.
Thirty participants were recruited from the adult population of Odesa and nearby villages by TNS Ukraine. Recruitment was conducted by word-of-mouth via the company's network of This is the pre-publication version of an article to be published in The International Journal of Press/Politics (accepted 20 October 2017). Please cite the published version. This version is for private research and study; it must not be distributed further.
Page 10 of 36 local facilitators; TNS paid participants an undisclosed sum as an incentive to take part. All potential participants answered a handful of 'screener' questions before being accepted into the project. 2 They had to reside in or near Odesa and follow the news 'at least several times a week' to be accepted. Otherwise, selection of participants was based on quotas to ensure a roughly even balance between age groups, genders and foreign policy preferences ('West-leaning', 'Russia-leaning' or 'non-aligned'; see Appendix).
Odesa makes an interesting site for fieldwork for many reasons. It is Ukraine's third biggest city and falls within the territory named 'Novorossiya' ('New Russia') by President Vladimir
Putin and Russian nationalists. In 2014 Odesa was the scene of fatal clashes between supporters and opponents of Euromaidan. Over 40 pro-Russian activists died when Odesa's
Trade Unions building was set alight during unrest, an event described as a 'massacre' by Russian television. 3 Since then, political opinion in the city has remained deeply divided and finely balanced. 4 Ukraine is sometimes perceived as having an identity fault line that divides predominantly 'Russian-speaking' southern and eastern regions from the west and centre, where the Ukrainian language is more widely used. Odesa lies in the south of Ukraine and its residents communicate mainly in Russian -but in fact, identities there are complex (Pirie 1996), most people are at least passively bilingual, and their political views are not predetermined by the language(s) they speak.
The participants were given a guide of six questions and asked to record diary entries in audio form using either their own mobile phone (if available), or inexpensive USB dictaphones. The guide asked participants to record the context in which they consumed news (where, when and with whom), the sources from which they obtained news, a summary of the stories they considered most important, and their reaction to those stories. This is the pre-publication version of an article to be published in The International Journal of Press/Politics (accepted 20 October 2017). Please cite the published version. This version is for private research and study; it must not be distributed further.
Page 11 of 36 Diary entries were made over the course of two weeks, generally once a day or so, although strict intervals for diary entries were not set so that participants would not feel obliged to consume news 'artificially' for the study. Interviews took place two or three weeks after submission of the diary recordings, in an office in Odesa. Each interview lasted between 40 and 80 minutes. Questions elicited the participants' reasons for using/avoiding and trusting/distrusting particular news sources; participants were also invited to voice their own narratives about Ukraine's relations with Russia, the USA and the European Union. All the audio diaries and interviews were transcribed in full by TNS Ukraine and imported into CAQDAS tool Atlas.ti for analysis.
The 'thematic analysis' method described by Braun and Clarke (2006) was used to analyse the transcripts. A coding frame was developed to categorise explanations for why the participants used or avoided news sources and why they regarded sources, messages or messengers as credible, or with scepticism. A preliminary set of 'theory-driven' coding categories was derived from the literatures on media repertoires and credibility discussed above. 5 During the coding process, the theory-driven categories were refined, collated or expanded as necessary to capture themes in the transcripts as clearly as possible. The
Atlas.ti software greatly facilitated this process: it allows the researcher to instantly retrieve and compare extracts coded into each category, to merge, split or rename categories and to keep detailed notes on category definitions. A single researcher (the author) was responsible for all coding. Critics might question the 'reliability' of coding by a single coder.
Thematic analysis is an inherently interpretive method; it does not claim to produce 'objective' knowledge of reality that can be validated through replication. However, to allay possible concerns about the trustworthiness of the interpretation, evidence of the themes This is the pre-publication version of an article to be published in The International Journal of Press/Politics (accepted 20 October 2017). Please cite the published version. This version is for private research and study; it must not be distributed further.
within the transcripts is presented below in the form of multiple illustrative quotations.
Themes that were most prevalent across the data corpus (i.e. observed in the transcripts of multiple participants) are foregrounded.
"Well, mail.ru is always first because of email…"
Participants included many news sources in their media repertoires with little regard for the quality or qualities of the news content. Rather, they were drawn to sources by content or functions which had nothing to do with current affairs. The theme of non-news affordances driving source selection was observed in transcripts from 17 participants (Table 1) . TV viewers tended to get news from whichever channel happened to be broadcasting the movie or soap opera they wanted to watch. Email accounts often drew internet users to web portals, which thus became the most convenient way of checking the day's top stories.
[ Table 1 about here]
Non-news affordances overlapped with a second theme, habit (observed in 12 participants).
The category 'habit' was used to code instances where participants reported using a news source without any clear motivation other than the fact that they always used it. Sometimes habits resulted from one-off decisions taken years ago -such as the choice of an internet browser, a homepage or the addition of a website to 'bookmarks'. The news feeds of multipurpose web portals Ukr.net, Yandex.ua (or the Yandex browser), mail.ru and rambler.ru were cited as habitual gateways to the news even more often than social media.
Portals like Yandex.ua and Ukr.net present users with a list of top news stories and, for each story, a selection of links to external sites that have reported the story. Participants reported clicking on such links at random; there was little conscious decision-making This is the pre-publication version of an article to be published in The International Journal of Press/Politics (accepted 20 October 2017). Please cite the published version. This version is for private research and study; it must not be distributed further.
Page 13 of 36 involved. Almost half the participants (13) mentioned spontaneous, random browsing, either online or through TV channels, when they described their news consumption behaviour (Table 2) .
[ Table 2 about here]
The themes of spontaneous browsing and non-news affordances suggest a low level of deliberation about news source selection. However, there was also evidence that certain sources were selected and avoided deliberately in line with attitudes. Seven participants were explicit about excluding news sources they particularly disagreed with (Table 3) ; most often these sources were TV channels with an obvious (geo)political editorial stance. Even more participants said that they avoided some sources due to 'bias' or 'lies' and preferred to use 'objective' sources -yet perceptions of what 'objective' news should look like varied hugely and were clearly shaped by (geo)political attitudes. Participants said they were selecting 'objective' sources, but in practice some of them were selecting sources associated with attitude-consistent narratives.
[ Table 3 about here]
It was notable that the 'West-leaning' participants hardly ever reported using sources associated with the Russian state, whereas virtually all the 'Russia-leaning' participants used both pro-Russian sources and some 'mainstream' Ukrainian sources that conveyed criticism of Russia. Six of the 12 'Russia-leaning' participants said they liked to compare Russian and Ukrainian sources and opinions, whereas only two of the seven 'non-aligned' participants did so, and just one of the 11 'West-leaning' participants. The 'Russia-leaning' participants tended to believe that both Russian and Ukrainian sources were propagandistic, so This is the pre-publication version of an article to be published in The International Journal of Press/Politics (accepted 20 October 2017). Please cite the published version. This version is for private research and study; it must not be distributed further.
comparing both sides and 'drawing one's own conclusions' (P28, P32) was better than relying on a single side alone. All the participants in this study had access to a diverse range of news media, so none were 'obliged' to engage with attitude-discrepant narratives due to lack of media choice. However, participants were frequently forced by their social context to engage with attitude-discrepant viewpoints during interpersonal communication. Four of the 11 'West-leaning' participants described conversations (sometimes heated) with their friends or relatives in Russia who backed the Russian state's narrative; five of the 12 'Russialeaning' participants similarly said that they heard (geo)political opinions contrary to their own from friends, colleagues, or even a wife in one case.
"Prices… the exchange rate… friends in other cities. Those will be my real news sources."
Most participants, regardless of their foreign policy preferences, felt that all news media should be approached with caution and should never be fully trusted. Almost half (14) made critical generalisations to the effect that 'the media lie, lie and don't tell the truth' (P8); 'there's no such thing as 100-per-cent truthful news' (P9); or 'journalism is a venal
[prodazhnaya] profession' (P25). When explaining their mistrust, the participants did not point to conflicting narratives as evidence. More often, they cited the vested interests of those who financed the media and concluded that 'whoever pays the piper picks the tune' (P30, P32). Scepticism was thus triggered by the perception of persuasive intent heuristic, based on varying levels of knowledge about who controls the media in Ukraine and Russia (Table 4) .
[ Table 4 about here] This is the pre-publication version of an article to be published in The International Journal of Press/Politics (accepted 20 October 2017). Please cite the published version. This version is for private research and study; it must not be distributed further. of the contradictory messages (P10, P11, P28, P30, P56), at 'the golden mean' (P62, P65).
Logically, however, there is no midway point between Russian tanks being present or not in Donbas, or one side rather than another shooting down the passenger plane MH17. What the participants meant in practical terms by saying that they compared sources to find truth 'in the middle' was evident in the diary transcripts. Participants rarely recorded themselves actively investigating the accuracy of reports by means of comparison. They simply included lots of sources in their media repertoires as a matter of course; then if a report was duplicated across sources its credibility was enhanced. Different sources attributed blame in different directions because they had different sponsors, and it was this blame for the This is the pre-publication version of an article to be published in The International Journal of Press/Politics (accepted 20 October 2017). Please cite the published version. This version is for private research and study; it must not be distributed further. For many participants, one-sided attributions of blame (or praise) were another indicator of low credibility linked to the perception of persuasive intent heuristic. The Ukrainian strategic narrative and Ukrainian news sources elicited scepticism among Russia-leaning and nonaligned participants partly because they were perceived as laying blame unrelentingly and exclusively on Russia for all manner of problems, some of which arguably had multiple causes (Table 5) .
[ Table 5 about here]
The fact that Russia-leaning and non-aligned participants objected to one-sided (Russiafocused) blame attribution more than West-leaning participants indicates the importance of existing beliefs in credibility assessments. West-leaning participants were generally unperturbed by unrelenting negativity about Russia which infuriated their Russia-leaning counterparts. They were also less inclined to doubt evidence that pointed to Russian misdeeds. For example, West-leaning participant P51 and Russia-leaning participant P63 both learnt about the results of the MH17 crash investigation from similar Ukrainian news sources. Whereas P51 concluded that 'all the data shows that [the missile which downed the airliner] was fired from a Russian BUK… everything shows that it was shot down by Russia', P63 was unconvinced by eyewitness testimonies presented by the investigators as evidence, arguing: 'you can find thousands of such actors'.
Existing attitudes towards Russia were likewise bound up in the participants' perceptions of 'what mattered' (as opposed to their perceptions of what had happened). It was suggested
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earlier that a strategic narrative's credibility might depend not just on confidence in certain 'facts', but also on the acceptance of particular values and priorities. There is support for this idea in the fact that over three-quarters of the participants expressed scepticism about news content based not on perceived factual inaccuracies, but on the belief that the wrong issues were being addressed (Table 6 ).
[ Table 6 about here]
The diaries and interviews strongly indicate that priorities, not just facts, were informing responses to narratives about international affairs. Russia-leaning participant P10, for example, said that 'of course' Russia was providing arms supplies to Donbas -thus accepting a key claim from the Ukrainian strategic narrative which is denied by the Kremlin. (Table 7) .
[ Table 7 about here]
As participants responded to narratives in the media and formulated narratives of their own to explain political developments, they all made repeated references to events from their own lives, as well as to information received from personal contacts. Personal experiences and information from trusted acquaintances were vital credibility benchmarks. When the Ukrainian media or politicians reported improvements in the economy, successes in the fight against corruption, or positive results of law enforcement reform, several participants (P8, P10, P61, P63, P54) sceptically retorted that they had seen little improvement in their own finances, were still forced to make illicit payments to their children's schoolteachers, or had personally witnessed police incompetence. When the Russian media had issued graphic warnings about Ukrainian nationalists coming to 'hang or eat children', a participant recalled 'waiting and waiting for them to come, but they didn't come… none of it is real' (P45).
Participants learned about the situation in Donbas from friends who had volunteered or served in the conflict, friends still living in the separatist-held territories and those who had moved from the conflict zone to Odesa (P1, P11, P14, P25, P32, P45, P66). Information from This is the pre-publication version of an article to be published in The International Journal of Press/Politics (accepted 20 October 2017). Please cite the published version. This version is for private research and study; it must not be distributed further.
Page 19 of 36 these trusted 'first-hand' sources, combined with everyday observations of life, helped participants to construct their own understanding of the 'truth' with confidence despite their lack of faith in media reports. As participant P45 put it:
'For me, the news will primarily be prices, prices in the shops, energy prices, those will be my main news sources. The exchange rate will be my main news source… friends in other cities, they will be real news sources. For me, everything else is just a big game in life, [set up] so that everyone who plays, one way or another, earns money.'
Influence via the media in international relations: Lessons from Ukraine
This article has provided a close-up view of how news consumers in a polarised, saturated media environment form their media repertoires and assess the credibility of news they encounter. It is clear that 30 audio-diarists cannot be representative of any larger population. Indeed, the diarists are probably somewhat atypical vis-à-vis the Ukrainian population as a whole in that they follow the news more closely than average. As with any small-n qualitative study, the goal here is therefore not to make 'distributional claims about a variable across a known population ' (Karpf et al 2015) , but rather to interrogate categories and concepts that are used in analysis and to draw lessons regarding the formulation and framing of research questions. Focussing on the audience has illuminated 'elements that go into the reception process' (Jensen 1987, p 33) and 'processes that might lead to effects' (Liebes and Katz 1986, p 152). These processes would be difficult if not impossible to discover using conventional quantitative techniques such as surveys.
Regarding media repertoire formation, the study exposed a relationship between the nonnews affordances of media and the reach of strategic narratives which has not previously This is the pre-publication version of an article to be published in The International Journal of Press/Politics (accepted 20 October 2017). Please cite the published version. This version is for private research and study; it must not be distributed further.
received much attention. The 'soft power' literature argues that movies and entertainment content can be 'attractive' to audiences and have persuasive power in their own right (Nye 2004). However, their potential role in drawing audiences to news sources that convey varying interpretations of global politics is not mentioned. The international broadcasters most frequently associated with non-coercive influence are 24-hour news channels (such as CCTV, Alhurra, Al Jazeera and RT), which do not offer obvious non-news affordances. News seems likely to reach larger audiences, more regularly, if it is embedded in a popular multifunctional platform like Russia's Yandex, or shown on channels that include popular entertainment programmes. This aspect of the strategic narrative reception process merits attention in future efforts to explain non-coercive influence.
The media repertoires of the Odesa diarists raise something of a question mark over the received wisdom that consuming news from a diverse range of sources is more normatively desirable than consuming news within a 'filter bubble' that excludes attitude-discrepant content. Among the diarists, it was predominantly the Russia-leaning participants who actively sought out different points of view -but in doing so, they accessed sources linked to the Russian state that are associated with deliberately misleading reporting. The practice of 'cross-checking' is recommended by media literacy advocates, but the Ukrainian case suggests that habitual cross-checking does not necessarily go hand in hand with media literacy, if cross-checking takes place with insufficient regard for source accuracy.
The Ukrainian case similarly disrupts the assumption that audiences support a foreign state's strategic narrative because they are 'vulnerable' to its influence activities. To describe an audience as vulnerable implies that it is excessively credulous, lacks critical thinking skills or perhaps lacks access to good quality journalism. In the present study, the This is the pre-publication version of an article to be published in The International Journal of Press/Politics (accepted 20 October 2017). Please cite the published version. This version is for private research and study; it must not be distributed further.
participants who sympathised with Russia's strategic narrative were no more credulous nor deprived of good journalism than their 'West-leaning' and 'non-aligned' counterparts. One cannot therefore attribute their attitudes solely to interaction between misleading Russian media content and their naivety. In fact, the 'Russia-leaning' participants did not particularly trust Russian sources and their views were shaped through exposure not only to the Russian narrative, but also to the fiercely anti-Russian Ukrainian narrative, which infuriated them.
Their infuriation at the Ukrainian narrative can be traced to their personal, social connections to Russia which they valued and perceived as threatened by Ukrainian politicians who had given them nothing in return. The present study thus supports the idea Decades of work on 'interpretive communities' have shown personal experience playing a This is the pre-publication version of an article to be published in The International Journal of Press/Politics (accepted 20 October 2017) . Please cite the published version. This version is for private research and study; it must not be distributed further.
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Page 25 of 36 5 For example, the initial coding frame included codes for the heuristics which people used to judge credibility, identified in previous research (the presence/absence of verification materials, source reputation and so on). This is the pre-publication version of an article to be published in The International Journal of Press/Politics (accepted 20 October 2017). Please cite the published version. This version is for private research and study; it must not be distributed further.
Tables
Page 34 of 36 This is the pre-publication version of an article to be published in The International Journal of Press/Politics (accepted 20 October 2017). Please cite the published version. This version is for private research and study; it must not be distributed further.
Page 35 of 36 it so much… I get the feeling they want, well, to distract people from real problems, to be blunt.' (P29) 'There's far too much information about Russia… about our war with them, our arms.
Nobody gets around to the real problems… the fact that quality of life is falling every
year…' (P26)
Page 36 of 36 My God!' (P61)
